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 The Supply and Demand Sides of Corruption:  
Canadian Extractive Companies in Africa 
 
Introduction 
       With the rapid expansion of Canadian investment in mining and oil & gas around the 
world (Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, 2014), it is perhaps not 
surprising that Canada’s reputation as a low corruption country has faltered: Canada currently 
ranks 9th internationally (with a score of 83/100) in Transparency International (TI)’s corruption 
perception index (down from 6th, and a score of 87/100 in 2010), and sixth (down from first (i.e. 
best) in 2009) in TI’s Bribe Payer’s index (Transparency International, 2011, 2015)1. In a cross-
Canada survey conducted by Leger Marketing for Transparency International 48 percent of 
respondents thought Canadian companies were corrupt (Transparency International, 2013). 
This article presents the preliminary findings of our ongoing research project2 which 
analyzes both the demand-side (that is, the request for bribes, principally by foreign officials) 
and the supply-side (that is, the giving of bribes, principally by corporations) of corruption. To 
date, we have examined Canadian mining companies operating in two African3 countries, Ghana 
and Burkina Faso4. On the demand-side, we are examining the causes of corruption and what 
measures are being taken by host country governments, and (especially) parliaments – a here-to-
fore largely neglected anti-corruption institution5 – to reduce corruption. On the supply-side, we 
are examining to what extent companies considered potential demands for corruption from host 
                                                     
1 In the Corruption Perceptions index, Canada’s drop represents increasing global perceptions of corruption in 
Canada, while in the Bribe Payers index, Canada’s drop represents global perception of increasing bribes by 
Canadian companies operating abroad. 
2 Funded by Canada’s Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council 
3 Canada is chosen because 75% of the world’s mining companies are based there. Africa is chosen because because 
African countries are among the most corrupt-prone (Transparency International 2015); these particular countries 
are chosen because we have good contacts with companies operating there, with governments and with parliaments. 
4 Field work in a third African country, Tanzania, will be undertaken in early 2017 
5 Stapenhurst, Pelizzo and Jacobs (2014) demonstrate that 64% of the variation of corruption across countries can be 
attributed to differences in the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight 
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government officials (such analyses typically assumed to be part of political risk analysis (e.g 
Bremmer 2005, Jessen 2012) and whether the corporations included the results of such analyses 
into their macro-planning (corporate policies and strategic planning) and micro-level 
planning/activities (corporate social responsibility).  
Public policies are being implemented in Ghana and Burkina Faso to reduce demand-side 
corruption (e.g. by increasing government accountability through better parliamentary oversight 
(Stapenhurst et al. 2014). Canada, like most other developed countries, is implementing policies 
to reduce supply-side corruption (e.g. by adopting anti-bribery legislation6 and guidelines for 
CSR7). However, the conceptual and theoretical framework to justify confidence in the potential 
success of these policies is lacking. Indeed, the four strands of research – namely, corruption, 
political risk assessment/management, CSR and parliamentary oversight, – have proceeded in 
parallel, with little cross-over, despite apparent synergy, thus limiting the incorporation of 
research findings into public policy formulation. This paper presents a first step toward exploring 
the nexus of these four areas.  
 
Context 
       The growth of the African mining industry has been an increasing focus of attention (De 
Backer 2012) . Since the 1990s, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have 
implemented series of development programs (Akabzaa and Darimani 2001) which, inter alia, 
entail economic mining poly reforms designed to accelerate the growth of the industry 
(Campbell 2008). Canada is one of the biggest players in African mining, with Canadian-based 
companies owning half of the 315 listed non-African mining businesses in Africa, six of the 12 
                                                     
6 In Canada, the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act  
7 In Canada, the federal government’s policy regarding CSR in the extractives industries, called “Doing Business the 
Canadian Way: A Strategy to Advance Corporate Social Responsibility in Canada’s Extractive Sector Abroad" was 
announced on Nov.14, 2014     
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largest companies operating in the continent are Canadian, and Canadian companies have 
invested around $20 billion in African mining projects (Campbell 2011). Assessing risk is thus 
vital for Canadian interests. 
Ghana and Burkina Faso rank 56th and 76th respectively, out of 167 countries in 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2015). 
This middling performance translates into most Canadian mining companies reporting that 
corruption is a ‘mild’ deterrent to investment in Ghana and  Burkina Faso  (McMahon and 
Cerantes 2012),     
 
Literature Review 
Political risk (which, according to many scholars and practitioners, typically includes 
corruption risk) arises when a company’s operations suffer as a result of political changes, 
instability, or host (or home) government interference with business operations. Scholars have 
identified two types of political risk; macro and micro (Stapenhurst 1992, Khattab et al. 2007, 
Emel and Huber 2008). There are various methods that can be used to ascertain risk (Goldstone 
et al. 2010), but many mining companies fail to undertake either political or corruption risk 
assessments (Rice and Mahmoud 1990, Dake 1992, Slovic 1999, Alon et al. 2006). This is a 
significant failing, as it leads such companies being reactive to local stakeholder demands rather 
than proactive. Assessments of micro-risks have underlined the importance of foreign investment 
to the local economy, but Polanyi (2001) noted that individuals, groups and communities may 
also be embedded in social and political relationships and that what is economically valuable 
may not necessarily be politically or socially viable. Alon and Herbert (2009) suggested that the 
extent to which a corporation can be viewed as beneficial for the local community depends on 
three factors: the company’s contribution to the local economy, the bargaining power of the firm 
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vis-à-vis the government and the governance structure of the company. Pelizzo (2010) adds that 
the benefits a corporation provides to a local community may be symbolic or material, objective 
or perceptive. It is not known if and to what extent Canadian mining companies in Africa are 
perceived to be beneficial by local communities, but anecdotal evidence suggests that they are 
not8.                                                                                                                                   
Corruption is an important indicator of the performance of a political system (Anderson 
and Tverdova 2003). Certain characteristics of host governments have been found to increase the 
prevalence of corruption related to the mining industry, including the poor quality of democracy 
(United States Institute of Peace 2010), political instability (Winbourne 2002), and government 
decentralization (Goel and Nelson 2011). The discourse of corruption varies greatly from one 
country to another since it is dependent on particular historical trajectories and everyday 
fragments of local culture. Social expectations marking acceptable behavior are not the same; but 
rather culturally specific and socially produced in the local context.   
Corruption is a two-sided transaction with a ‘payer’ (the supply side of corruption) and a 
receiver (the demand side). In terms of the supply side, multi-national corporations – usually but 
not always from advanced countries - pay bribes to public officials (often, but not always in 
developing countries). On the demand side, the costs of corruption are well documented. 
Countries with higher levels of corruption have lower levels of economic growth (Mauro 1995), 
less investment (Lambsdorff 2003) and lower levels of inward foreign investment (Wei 2000), 
especially from countries with laws against corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra 2016). But as Cuervo-
Cazurra (2016) points out, on the supply side, the consensus is less clear. While corruption 
increases the costs of doing business (Kaufmann 1997, Svensson 2005) individual companies 
                                                     
8 Comment by Tanzanian investigative journalist Lawrence Kiliminwiko to Stapenhurst in 2005: “Canadian mining 
companies are the worst (in terms of good corporate citizenship)” 
 5 
may benefit from getting government contracts or from by-passing complex regulations 
(Huntingdon 1968). 
Many developed countries are starting to tackle the supply side of corruption by making 
bribe-giving a criminal offence. Canada enacted the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act 
in 1999 but even now is only “moderately” (OECD, 2013) enforcing the law. Canada tops the list 
of corrupt businesses barred from bidding on World Bank projects (Financial Post, September 
18, 2013).    
Corporate social responsibility programs can help mining firms resolve their micro-
political risk problems (Knox and Maklan 2004, Rangan et al. 2012, Africa Study Group 2013). 
Different standards have been created to assist mining firms in the development of CSR, most 
prominent of which is the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) ‘Performance Standards on 
Environmental and Social Sustainability’ (2012). To assist, Canada’s Department of Global 
Affairs has re-aligned its development assistance programs to provide support to Canadian 
companies investing in developing countries to meet these standards (Fantino, 2012). To meet 
the increasing demand for good corporate citizenship, a growing number of corporations around 
the world are practising some form of CSR. However, ongoing tensions between business and 
social/environmental goals remain. The World Bank found pockets of excellence from which 
lessons can be drawn, but gaps in company-community engagement at the project-level. 
Interestingly, Cuervo-Cazurra (2016) introduces the concept of corporate social irresponsibility – 
the notion of corporate managers using corruption to gain a competitive advantage. 
Diagram 1 presents our project’s theoretical framework. At the core is the relationship 
between the mining firm in the host country and local stakeholders. The line of inquiry (bold 
lines) is upstream, to examine how the company assesses micro-political risks, particularly as 
they relate to corruption issues, and downstream, to examine how this shapes relations with the 
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host government and parliament. The key theories we draw on are shown in the shaded boxes. 
For this article, we are presenting the preliminary findings on the how Canadian mining 
companies undertake corruption risk assessment, and how this informs corporate activity in the 
host country (i.e. the supply side of corruption) and the actions of host country governments and 
parliaments, and how these affect the demand side of corruption.  
 







 We have adopted a qualitative research approach, surveying and interviewing 
approximately 60 key informants: Canadian mining officials, host government officials, 
legislators and civil society representatives, in Canada, Burkina Faso and Ghana. We have also 
conducted a significant document search to gather other (home and host) country-specific 
evidence. We have adopted a mixed method of data collection because we recognize that 
traditional social science methods like surveys and quantitative studies run the risk of being 
identified with police interrogations and they may produce embarrassed silence and biased 
results. By engaging in semi-structured conversations and by immersed ourselves in people’s 
everyday discourses we able to gather a contextual richness (including observations and 
anecdotes) typically lost in purely quantitative research. 
  
Data Analysis  
       Thematic analysis (Miles and Huberman 1994) was used to examine interview and field 
work data.  Transcribed interviews were read to get an overview of the responses. They were re-
read and first level codes were assigned to data by two researchers independently. These first 
level codes were then clustered into themes. The data were again reviewed to ensure that the 
content fit the identified categories. The themes were reworked until two researchers reached 
agreement and all coded data fit into the identified themes. These constitute the basis for the 
themes described in the Results section, below.  
     Then all the qualitative materials and data were reviewed using constant comparison 
method (Glaser and Strauss 1967), and the following blocks were produced: 1) Memos that 
capture similarities and differences in participants’ perspectives of corruption; 2) A catalogue of 
the community projects, CSR practices, ethical codes of Canadian mining companies operating 
in the African context; 3) An inventory of all metaphors, meanings, rituals and symbols 
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encountered during field work and ethnography. The data obtained from these blocks confirmed 
the themes identified in the thematic analysis.   
Results 
Our results to date indicate ten interesting findings and tensions.  
The first contradiction and tension is regarding the definition of corruption. Generally, 
host country civil society representatives and, to a somewhat lesser degree, government officials 
and legislators, defined corruption broadly, as ‘the abuse of public trust for personal gain’, 
consistent with much of the literature (see, for example, Alvaro Cuervo-Cazzura, 2016); indeed, 
one respondent went further and argued that “It is not only public office holders who are corrupt. 
There is evidence that private sector actors engage in corruption. The definition should be 
broadened to include everyone.” In contrast, corporate officials defined it more narrowly, as ‘an 
illegal payment to a public official for corporate or personal benefit’ (consistent with Rose-
Ackerman, 1999 and 2006). 
The second tension that arose from the data was regarding the costs of corruption. Host 
country informants tended to describe the costs of corruption in socio-economic and 
development terms: “Through corruption the state is losing effectiveness, efficiency and 
resources in general.” “Corruption is impacting the economy as a whole”, generally consistent 
with development theorists and practitioners (e.g. Mauro, 1995; Kaufmann & Dininio, 2006).  
By contrast, corporate respondents referred to the additional cost of the bribe itself, plus – and 
more notably “the time spent by management in attending to investigations, press inquiries or 
regulatory processes [which] can distract management from the business of developing or 
operating a mineral property” (L’expert, 2012) and management time spent with corrupt 
bureaucrats (Kaufmann, 1997). 
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A third tension is between official corporate policy against corruption and the 
necessity to give bribes in order to do business in Africa. Interestingly, corporate officials at 
headquarters in Toronto, Montreal, Calgary and Vancouver were generally aware of the anti-
bribery provisions in Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA), passed in 
1999, which made the bribing of foreign officials by Canadian companies a criminal act. Not 
enforced until a decade later, the Can $ 9.5 million fine Niko Resources paid for bribing a 
government Minister in Bangladesh “was a wake-up call to Canadian companies operating 
abroad to more rigorously control corruption by their officials”. While some company officials 
in host countries were reluctant to be interviewed by us ‘without permission from headquarters’, 
others were more forthcoming. Reported by one official, the company “bribes frequently”, 
notwithstanding the official company line that “we never bribe”. Some corporate officials 
working in Africa were unfamiliar with the CFPOA.  
A fourth tension is recognition of a need to assess corruption risk and actually doing 
so. The majority of corporate respondents believed that their company had better anti-corruption 
policy/programs than other companies in the same industry. They strongly agreed that their 
company emphasized the importance of ethics and social responsibilities in society and that their 
company rejected offers of bribery. However few companies undertake corruption risk 
assessment prior to undertaking investment and several are seeking guidance regarding the 
dilemma they are facing: under Canadian law, it is illegal to bribe foreign officials, but the reality 
on the ground is that nothing gets done without some sort of bribe.  The majority of respondents 
reported that there is both petty and grand corruption: “[There is…] some - in that it helps to 
have connections and relationships to ensure that the bureaucracy does its job on a timely 
basis.” The majority of the correspondents viewed corruption as a necessary evil that comes with 
doing business in Africa:  “There is corruption in all industries due to a lack of the rule of law - 
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the laws are there but they are not fairly and generally applied - corruption up to level of courts 
and ministers...and by inference – president”.  
While respondents from mining companies reported that they have a code of conduct or 
system of due diligence to prevent corruption, along the lines of that proposed by Troyer and 
Boucher (date unknown) and Klotz (2013), they admitted that their officials and agents (or at 
least, officials from other companies) did pay bribes: “There are known examples with other 
companies operating there” “It is part of doing business in that part of the world.” In the words 
of a senior manager: “[There is a]… a certain group of companies who, by that corruption, 
support the lack of will to change. This supports the Governmental groups and gangs who thus 
maintain this time honoured practice. The way ahead in [name of country withheld by authors] is 
the shake down method learned from an early age.” This may be a particular problem for junior 
companies (Christer Michelsen Institute, 2015) that generally lack the resources or knowledge to 
implement sophisticated due diligence systems. 
A fifth tension is between the large and integrated mining companies and the smaller 
(“junior”) exploration and development companies. The latter, said a senior host government 
official,“…can be unscrupulous. A company came fuming [to the appropriate government 
department when its license was refused] but a few weeks later obtained one of the open grants. 
So when the law suits them, they comply. When it doesn’t, then they try to get around it.” One 
civil society representative concurred: “The stories about these [foreign] companies, particularly 
the juniors (and especially the Canadian companies) are not good.” However, when asked, a 
senior host government official said: “The larger companies are just as bad. It is just that they 
have the resources and knowledge to avoid getting caught.” The data suggested that there are 
differences in the strategies, resources, and discourses of large and small companies; however 
corruption seemed to be a prevalent problem for both large and small companies.   
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A sixth tension is the gap between law and practice in host countries. All of the three 
countries in this study have laws against corruption. In Ghana, for example, the Criminal 
Code criminalises corruption in the form of active and passive bribery, extortion, wilful 
exploitation of public office, use of public office for private gain and bribery of foreign public 
officials. Corruption is illegal and both agent and principal are liable; the nationality of the 
person who is bribing or being bribed is irrelevant (Business Anti-Corruption Portal-GAN). 
 The problem on the demand side is not lack of laws, but lack of their implementation. 
Said one host country government official: “There are so many laws that tell you what not to do 
but do not spell out what happens if you do it. There is a very weak sanctions regime and very 
weak oversight mechanisms. Parliament’s understanding and appreciation of the issues is very 
low so they are unable to do much.” A civil society representative explained that the core of the 
problem is institutional: “The institutions that are mandated with enforcing the law are not 
independent enough. The Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice is 
financially constrained, just like many other [oversight] institutions. It needs to be resourced to 
be independent [from government control] to fight corruption” and that “…issues of corruption 
often become politicized which makes it difficult to prosecute.” Another striking case, narrated 
by a civil society representative, demonstrates how corruption is multilayered and entangled with 
multiple institutions: “In regard to environmental pollution in the communities or mining areas, 
and the extent to which states institutions – such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-  
are supposed to regulate the operations of mining companies all enforce compliance of the law, 
such institutions are quick to take up the defense of the very companies they are supposed to be 
regulating. The nature of such defense shows some level of interference in terms of possible 
corrupt practices that might have taken place. For example, [name of company withheld by 
authors] is a Canadian company operating in the [name of region withheld by authors] region of 
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Ghana. The company was supposed to post a bond a requirement under Ghanaian law for 
reclamation of the environment after the mines closed.  The company wound up its operations 
and left the country, leaving a depleted environment and various unpaid bills while the EPA at 
the same time was reporting that the company was requesting a time extension for the posting of 
the bond. It was subsequently indicated that there was some level of exchange of money between 
the company and EPA, which resulted in the EPA continually requested an extension to the bond 
posting.” 
The existence of weak state institutions was confirmed by a government official, who 
noted that: “There are very weak oversight institutions. There is weak supervision from 
regulatory bodies, some of which rely on mining companies to cover their costs of regulation. 
Furthermore, the [host country] parliament’s understanding of the issues is very low so they are 
unable to do much.” Another example was provided by a high ranking official who said the 
major oil and gas contracts were considered by the parliamentary energy committee but that “the 
Members of Parliament on the Energy Committee attested not to understanding the terms of the 
contract, but that the agreement was approved by Parliament anyway.” One Member of 
Parliament summarized this theme as follows: “It is not a lack of laws that is the problem, rather 
it is the weak implementation of the laws that is the problem.” 
A major related problem reported by respondent MPs was the lack of public culture of 
accountability in host countries: “Accountability in Ghana has a very short 
history…accountability has come into Ghanaian culture only recently. It is only recently that we 
have begun to question people who seem not to be accountable or transparent.” It is perhaps not 
surprising, then, to find that 76% of Ghanaians reported in 2015 that corruption had increased 
over the previous 12 months  – the largest reported increase in Africa other than South Africa 
(Transparency International - Global Corruption Barometer, 2015). In Burkina Faso, the situation 
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is similar: said one National Assembly member: “…a law against corruption was passed by the 
National Assembly but implementation of that law is lacking.”  
A seventh tension regards corporate social responsibility (CSR). Mining companies, 
host governments and civil society representatives have different perspectives: mining 
companies often see CSR as a means to fight corruption and/or to promote local good will, 
although host key informants often see it as self-serving or even contributing to corruption. A 
majority of mining company respondents said that their companies use CSR to help combat 
corruption.  One manager provided examples of these CSR activities as follows: “We have 
engaged in different collective action efforts …These include engagement with communities, 
education, transparency efforts, and information sharing with government officials and other 
companies.” Another manager similarly described a diverse range of CSR activities intended to 
reduce corruption:  “We use our CSR activities to illustrate the benefits to the community 
employment and assistance with local initiatives. Road, water, school and to control the havoc 
from illegal mining activities.”  
On the other hand, some companies disagreed with the view that CSR activities curbed 
corruption: “Social responsibility activities are not targeted to curb corruption but we believe 
assistance to local community will improve community life and therefore potential for 
involvement in corruption decreased.”. The view from host government officials, civil society 
representatives and MPs is mixed, in terms of whether CSR programs are part of the solution to 
reduce corruption, with some suggesting that it is part of the problem: “CSR programs have 
increased, rather than decreased, corruption. The approaches by many companies to CSR 
questionable.” This would seem to support Cuervo-Cazurra’s (2016) notion of ‘corporate social 
irresponsibility’. Another official suggested that: “Corporate social responsibility projects are 
not necessarily good or bad, but the fundamental reason for them is so that the mining company 
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can receive a tax deduction for expenses incurred. Some sort of minimum national standard 
should be established that mining companies could be asked to adhere to.” A third official 
pointed to a major recurrent challenge: “The problem boils down to the fact that there are 
substantial expectations that local communities have when a mining project starts. When these 
expectations are not met, activists in the community may disrupt mining operations, thereby 
holding the company to ransom”.  In short, there is a long-standing discussion around whether 
CSR is just another term for ‘greenwashing,’ or whether CSR is a platform for ensuring 
sensitivity to social and environmental concerns, facilitating local social and economic 
development and shared value; and for addressing impacts and redressing harms when they 
occur9. 
An eighth tension regards how companies deal with local chiefs and governments. A 
particular problem is that many mining companies do not fully appreciate local customs and 
traditions, with the result that the traditional concept of paying (modest) tributes to tribal chiefs 
as a token of respect… “Actually there is usually a kind of relationship between the mining 
companies and the Chiefs in terms of granting contracts, which boils down to saying: ‘take this 
and then make sure you silence your people from protesting about operations.” One government 
official noted that: “one of the Chiefs in a region in which a large multinational mining company 
operates, is alleged to have received gifts including cars, foreign trips and contracts from the 
mining company. The revenues that go to traditional Chiefs and the local district assemblies is 
largely unaccounted for.” 
 A former Member of Parliament explained the cross-cultural gap as follows: “One of our 
values is that when going to a tribal chief, you cannot go empty-handed in the traditional sense, 
a bottle or two of schnapps is enough but when mining companies are visiting the chief maybe it 
                                                     
9 We are grateful to Jeffrey Davidson for this comment 
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could be that intermediaries mistake these companies to send big gift so large amounts of money 
or maybe it could also be that the companies think the Chiefs are corruptible so they go 
prepared to pay their way through in so doing the companies may be responding to our 
traditional values but to what extent? Some of these gifts are clearly meant to influence the chief 
to act in one way or another I'm not to swear to compromise.”  
These observations support the findings of Standing and Hilson (2013) that “In Ghana 
45% of mineral revenue disseminated to the grassroots is, at some point, ‘handled’ by traditional 
authorities and that too often Ghana’s chiefs have tended to show a low level of interest in 
investing the revenues derived from natural resource wealth in their jurisdictions” (page 6). 
Furthermore, quoting the CHRAJ report (page 5) they state that: “…Communities impacted by 
mining activities do not directly benefit from mining royalties. In most cases, most communities 
did not even know of the existence of the facility [transfer of funds to their chief]. In 
communities where people expressed knowledge of the facility, they said the chief was the main 
beneficiary of these funds.” (Standing & Hilson, 2013 page 7).   
Local governments and assemblies, with which mining companies also collaborate to 
obtain ‘social license’ are no better. In the words of a Member of Parliament: “The actors can be 
both at the local and state level. Take the connivance of local politicians and chiefs because 
when he comes to mining, the Chiefs wield significant power due royalty issues. But the Chiefs 
do not have the power to mobilize state support to be able to allow such operations but he/she 
can do so if they align themselves with a local or national politician. It is not surprising, then, 
that according to the latest Afrobarometer report (2015), that 62 % of Ghanaians have little or no 
trust in their local assembly and 47% have little or no trust in traditional leaders.  
A ninth tension concerns small-scale or artisanal mining. Early commentators, such as 
the World Bank, saw such mining as “…fertile ground for the growth of indigenous 
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entrepreneurship” (Noetstaller, 1987, page 16, quoted in Hilson, 2009), as creating a social safety 
net and cash generating alternative for local people in times of economic or environmental stress 
(Davidson, 1993), and as providing livelihoods for retrenched civil servants, teachers and others 
as a result of structural adjustment policies (e.g Banchirigah, 2006; and Chachage, 1995). In 
most countries, such mining is illegal (i.e. miners do not have a license to mine) and, in recent 
years has expanded greatly, with adverse environmental and safety concerns.  Our data 
confirmed the rise of such illegal mining practices: A former mayor in Burkina Faso reported 
that “There is corruption, particularly in the galamsey or illegal mining and it gets worse as the 
election nears.” Some host government interviewees confirmed the problem and concern, noting 
that increasingly, such mining “is backed by foreign (particularly Chinese) investors. In Ghana, 
where such mining is colloquially referred to as ‘galamsey’, it is estimated that there are 200,000 
artisanal miners, and in Burkina Faso 150,000. In 2006, Banchirigah reported that there were 
“…tens of thousands of illegal artisanal miners now working with the concession awarded to the 
Canadian multinational Golden Star Resources. The company has no intention to mine the 
plot…” having decided that it is unfeasible economically; yet its management remains opposed 
to the idea of returning the land of the government for possible demarcation to small-scale 
miners. Mining companies in our data set remain concerned. One representative summarized this 
as follows: “It is clear that corruption has increased in the country (Ghana) in the last 5 years 
and the huge impact has been in a dramatic increase in illegal mining which appears to be 
happening with impunity if it is not brought under control it will lead to the formal mining sector 
beginning to leave.”  In Burkina Faso, a former mayor reported: “When I was mayor, a small-
scale miner came to me to explain the problems he had with a competitor and asked for my 
intervention. At the end of the meeting, the miner gave me an envelope, containing money”. 
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Finally, a tenth tension relates to the multitude of stakeholders yet a piecemeal 
approach to the problem. There are, clearly, two sides to corruption, the supply side and the 
demand side. On the supply side, there are mining companies many of which, in order to be good 
corporate citizens and not face prosecution under home government laws that make foreign 
bribery illegal, have adopted compliance regimes and codes of conduct for their employees. 
There appears to be a dichotomy between corporate head office officials, who espouse anti-
bribery initiatives, and employees based in host countries who face the day-to-day pressures to 
bribe to get things done. There is also the home country parliament, which has the responsibility 
to ensure that anti-bribery laws are implemented. On the demand side, there are host government 
officials at both the national and local levels and tribal chiefs who demand bribes, host country 
oversight institutions (including parliaments) which do not adequately ensure that national anti-
corruption laws are implemented.  
 
Discussion 
  The findings clearly illustrate that corruption in this context can be characterised as a 
‘wicked problem’ (Head and Alford, 2015; Rittel and Webber, 1973) as there is no definitive 
formulation or solution, the problems are socially complex and multi-layered with many 
stakeholders, proposed measures may have unforeseen effects, and there are many 
interdependencies and multi-causal aspects (Head and Alford, 2015).  As the responsibilities to 
solve the corruption problem in the mining sector in Africa stretch across multiple organizations 
and stakeholders, their perspectives and the gaps and contradictions among these perspectives do 
matter.  In this regard, this paper has outlined some of these gaps, issues, and tensions that arose 
from our field research. These findings clearly demonstrate that any attempts to prevent 
corruption require radical shifts in attitudes and deep behavioural changes by managers, mining 
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professionals, local administrators, citizens, host government representatives, members of 
parliament, civil society leaders, and other stakeholder groups. 
 Findings also indicate that corruption is an ambiguous phenomenon often causing 
diverse, ambivalent, and contradictory understandings among scholars, policymakers, and 
practitioners alike. Given such ambiguousness, discourses of corruption can only be understood 
when seen as part of wider social and cultural contexts. In this article we have argued for a 
broader understanding of corruption. Finding the conventional definition on corruption too 
narrow and excessively concerned with the illegality of practices, a more open approach has 
been argued for. Anthropological research might open up new venues as it has an inventory of 
methodological tools and analytical approaches appropriate for capturing people’s own 
assessments of courses of action. 
 The most interesting debates about corruption are those which explore the complex 
relations between private and public sectors in particular contexts, and those that embed analyses 
within an appropriate understanding of local political cultures and unique historical contexts. 
These ask vital questions about concepts such as transparency, accountability and governance 
and ask us to analyse what they mean within the socio-political and cultural context in which 
they were constructed.  
 Several approaches mention that those involved in corruption deny doing or intending 
harm. Perpetrators try to avoid the term ‘corruption’ and disengage their actions from ethical and 
moral discourses. Part of a strategy to fight corruption for corruption researchers is to emphasize 
and highlight the moral aspects of corruption and corruption cases. Who is the victim? What is 
the harm? Identifying the victims and damage gives corruption a face and a voice. We know 
from social science theories on morality and ethics that victims who can be seen and heard 
receive more attention. Further research also needs to provide a holistic and multi-layered 
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perspective of corruption dynamics; which can only be achieved through a triangulation of 
research methods collecting data from diverse stakeholders.   
Public Policy and Corporate Implications 
        Regarding the demand side of corruption, anti-corruption laws are largely unenforced. 
This seems to reflect a lack of political will among some key influential bureaucrats and 
politicians to combat corruption. What is needed is a multi-stakeholder approach, involving 
governments, parliaments, civil society, the media and business. The host country parliament – 
charged with overseeing probity and accountability of government, needs to more effectively 
oversee public sector activities. As well as strengthened oversight committees – such as Public 
Accounts and Finance - parliaments need to ensure that other ‘watchdog’ institutions – such as 
supreme audit institutions, ombuds offices, and anti-corruption agencies, are adequately 
resourced and operate freely, without government interference. They also need to verify that all 
points of contact through the project cycle (from the granting of licenses, through mining 
agreements, contracting, procurement and revenue payment) between mining companies and 
local (including tribal leaders) and national governments are transparent. The Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative is a step in the right direction10, but only covers payments 
from companies to governments – it needs to be more rigorously expanded to cover other parts 
of the project cycle11. Both parliaments and governments need to encourage ethical behaviour by 
their members and staff, through the establishment of ethics regimes, including codes of conduct, 
                                                     
10 Part of EITI is developing local in-country capacity to hold the central government to account for the way it 
spends or allocates these revenues.  Several of our respondents noted, however, than implementation of EITI in host 
countries remains weak, as does oversight (and even knowledge of EITI) by host parliaments. 
 
11 As is now happening with EITI++ (i.e. upstream and downstream approaches) and a variety of home country 




restrictions on the receipt of gifts, declaration of interests (to avoid a conflict of interest) and 
declaration of assets (for both politicians and senior officials and their close family members), 
and declaration of interests. Such regimes should operate in a wholly transparent fashion and 
have sanctions for wrong-doing. In short, public officials need to be encouraged to serve the 
public, not themselves.  
        Civil society has important roles to play. As Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2012) pointed out, 
governments and parliaments will rarely act with probity, unless citizens demand this of 
governments and parliaments as a precondition for (re-) election of politicians, who in turn 
demand this of public servants. The media plays a critical role in reporting incidences of 
corruption – and following up on actions taken against the miscreants. Here, an access to 
information law can assist the media carry out its investigative functions, as can the repeal of 
laws, such as seditious libel, which some governments use to restrict investigative journalism.              
       On the supply side, the Canadian parliament, government and mining companies can all 
help reduce corruption. Canada was an early signatory to the OECD Convention Against 
Corruption, and after a slow start the RCMP are becoming more rigorous in investigating foreign 
corruption by Canadian companies. Despite recent improvement, moving up the OECD 
convention enforcement rankings from 9th in 2012 to 6th in 2014, more can be done: the 
Canadian government still lags behind the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and 
Switzerland in the implementation of anti-bribery legislation. The government has already 
beefed up support through Global Affairs’ Trade Commissioner Service and Export 
Development Canada. Further support could be given to Canadian companies to help them better 
understand and assess corruption risks and avoid demands for bribes, and to host country 
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parliaments to better EITI and other transparency initiatives12. The Canadian parliament also has 
a role to play overseeing the implementation of such policies. 
       And of course, Canadian mining companies need to take a more pro-active stance against 
corruption. The incentive for many to develop anti-corruption compliance programs is the threat 
of investigation by the RCMP. Perhaps a better understanding of why corruption is, in the words 
of former World Bank President James Wolfensohn, “a cancer” and how it distorts public policy 
making in host countries, weakens governance and democracy and ultimately impacts adversely 
on the poor would be an additional incentive to reduce the supply of corruption. Many of the 
large integrated mining companies already have relatively sophisticated compliance and ethics 
regimes; these need to be main-streamed within their global operations. Junior companies 
generally do not have such in-company anti-corruption programs. The outputs of this research 
project should assist them in developing such programs.   
Conclusions 
There is a larger agenda of research that can be conducted to shed further light into the 
dynamics of corruption in the mining sector in Africa:  First, further research should develop an 
integrated framework to link corruption, political risk, corporate anti-corruption programs, 
including CSR initiatives, and host government accountability through parliamentary oversight. 
The hypotheses regarding the links between these variables could be tested; thereby creating an 
empirical model based on the framework. Second, further research can inquire whether corporate 
anti-corruption programs and CSR activities are reactive to host country corruption problems and 
adverse stakeholder reaction, or whether, via ex-ante micro-political risk assessment, such 
corruption problems can be anticipated and corporate activities, including CSR, can be designed 
                                                     
12 With Canadian government support, UN Global Compact Network Canada has recently published the e*book 
“Designing an Anti-Corruption Compliance Program: a Guide for Canadian Businesses” 
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pro-actively and strategically.   Third, further research should examine if, and to what extent, the 
host governments (both executives and legislatures) take into account corruption problems 
associated with foreign direct investment in the extractive industries at the national and 
constituency (project site) levels.  Fourth, there is a need for further research and guidance for 
mining companies on how to manage political risks and corruption as well as for the home and 
host governments and parliaments on how to develop appropriate public policies regarding 
corruption problems caused by mining operations.  
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